Japan’s Anti-Spy Law & Economic Security 2026: Impact of National Intelligence Bureau
Mar 16, 2026UP!
- Blog
- Anti-Spy Law
- Economic Security
- National Intelligence Bureau
- Security Clearance
- Technology Leakage
- Trade Secrets
Japan’s Current Situation — The Structural Absence of an Anti-Spy Law
In 1985, the “Bill for the Prevention of Acts of Espionage Related to State Secrets” was submitted to the Diet. However, due to strong concerns over human rights violations, it was ultimately scrapped without passage (Japan Federation of Bar Associations Statement, 1985). Since then, Japan has not enacted an independent anti-espionage law that criminalizes general acts of spying. This legislative absence has fueled ongoing criticism that Japan remains a “spy’s paradise.”Recent Developments — Economic Security and Security Clearance
In May 2024, the “Act on the Protection and Utilization of Important Economic Security Information” was enacted and came into effect in May 2025. This law introduces a security clearance system in the field of economic security to prevent the leakage of sensitive “economic security information.” However, this law focuses specifically on protecting sensitive information related to economic security, not on criminalizing general intelligence or espionage activities. In this sense, its function differs from that of a comprehensive anti-spy law.An Era Where Foreign Governments Directly Target Japanese Companies
In 2025, Taiwanese prosecutors indicted a Taiwanese subsidiary of Tokyo Electron for violating the National Security Act, seeking a fine of approximately 600 million yen. The case involved the unlawful acquisition of confidential information related to TSMC’s 2-nanometer semiconductor technology. A former TSMC employee who joined the subsidiary was found to have obtained trade secrets constituting “national core critical technology.” The Taiwanese High Prosecutors Office determined that not only individuals but also corporations may bear criminal liability under the National Security Act for insufficient supervisory and preventive measures. This demonstrates that in an era where “advanced technology is national security,” Japanese subsidiaries abroad can directly fall within the jurisdiction of other countries’ national security laws. As seen in the POSCO incident (see separate article), the key policy question today is how to effectively prevent the outflow of strategically sensitive technologies.The Takai Government’s National Intelligence Bureau — More Than Administrative Reorganization
The establishment of the National Intelligence Bureau promoted by the Takai administration is not merely an administrative reform. On March 13, 2026, the Cabinet approved the “Bill to Establish the National Intelligence Council,” with the aim of enactment during the current Diet session and launch in July 2026. Additionally, an expert panel on foreign anti-espionage laws is expected to be established this summer, followed by related bills to be submitted in the autumn Diet session, potentially paving the way for Japan’s first foreign intelligence agency. Japan has already been developing its framework step by step: the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets (2013), the Economic Security Promotion Act (2022), and the Act on the Protection and Utilization of Important Economic Security Information with its security clearance system (2024–2025). The proposed National Intelligence Bureau would serve as a command center for intelligence policy — ultimately leading toward serious debate over a Japanese version of an anti-spy law imposing criminal penalties on corporate and research espionage.Implications for Companies — From Information Recipients to Intelligence Actors
For companies, this shift is not limited to the realm of national information security — it directly redefines corporate behavior itself. When a company’s technology qualifies as “important economic security information” or “critical technology,” its decisions on research partners and data-sharing countries will increasingly be shaped by national intelligence risk assessments and allied security expectations. As a result, companies will no longer be passive “recipients” of information but will be expected to act as “intelligence entities” themselves — gathering, analyzing, and integrating information into strategic decision-making. This raises a crucial organizational question: to what extent can the legal and compliance departments internalize corporate intelligence functions as part of the company’s strategic architecture?You are welcome to contact us via the Contact Form to discuss and for more information.